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COMMENTS MADE AT THE BEN J. ALTHEIMER SYMPOSIUM ON
THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE CENTRAL HIGH CRISIS HELD
AT THE UALR WILLIAM H. BOWEN SCHOOL OF LAW
John W. Walker*
I had the fortune of being a student in college in 1957. That was the
year of the so-called "Little Rock Crisis." Before then I had the good fortune
of meeting Wiley Branton, who induced me and several other students along
with George Howard, who was a co-inducer, to participate in sit-in demon-
strations with respect to buses, lunch counters, swimming pools, and other
activities in Pine Bluff. So my orientation to what was happening was pretty
close, and then when I finished college I had the privilege of being the
second Associate Director of the Arkansas Council on Human Relations, a
bi-racial organization then devoted to ameliorate the racial conditions that
existed in the Little Rock community.
We're dealing today with the subject of the litigation strategy that un-
derpinned the Little Rock school case. That has to begin way before 1957.
In fact, it began when the NAACP, through Charles Houston and Thurgood
Marshall and others, determined to approach the "separate but equal" con-
cept at the graduate and professional school level, and by a carefully de-
signed plan they were able to establish the principles that (1) separate and
unequal educational opportunities did exist at the graduate level and (2) the
Supreme Court should change those things that the Supreme Court did
change. And it came, therefore, as no surprise to many people that the Su-
preme Court had to continue in Brown what it had started in the graduate
schools, because it was clear that schools were unequal and that black child-
ren could not have equal opportunity without there being some different
kind of plan.
Wiley Branton was perhaps the lead lawyer in the matter, but his impe-
tus came from Thurgood Marshall. Wiley had been out of school at that time
approximately two years when the Supreme Court case was argued. So he
was on the ground floor as a new lawyer trying to help develop a litigation
strategy by which to address Little Rock, Arkansas, school segregation. It is
important to note that at that time there were hardly any black lawyers in the
city, and the few who were had chosen not to participate in this particular
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matter as a priority. Wiley lived in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, and had to com-
mute here in order to be involved.
The community of Little Rock was regarded as reasonably progressive.
Black people got along well, and they got along well because they did not
raise any issues and they took whatever it was. And as a consequence it was
surprising that Daisy Bates had support from reputable legal authority when
the school case was initiated in 1956 by a group of some thirty-six students
and their parents, and it was called John Aaron and others v. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper, Dr. Cooper I think, was the president of the Little Rock
School Board. The community was really surprised, and Virgil Blossom was
even more surprised, because before that time he had encountered a rather
docile community-whatever he did was acceptable and accepted. And be-
cause students were being fairly well treated in comparison to black students
in the rest of the state, people here had a certain degree of pride. Dunbar
High School was well recognized state-wide and nationally. Our students
could do well, provided they went away from Little Rock, or provided they
stayed here and taught. So there was a degree of pride in the community.
Well, in 1956 those thirty-six children and their parents set a different
tone, and it had to be addressed. The case first went before a hostile federal
judge. His name was John Miller, and he was from Fort Smith, Arkansas.
John Miller took pride in being able to say privately to the members of the
white bar, some of whom related to us his attitude, that he certainly would
give us due process by affording us hearings or affording the students hear-
ings, and then he would just go ahead and deny us equal protection of the
laws. So you do what you want under the 14th Amendment-you give due
process, you satisfy what Brown v. Board of Education says-and then you
do as little as possible.
And that, indeed, was the strategy of the Little Rock School District-
to do as little as possible for as long as possible and to delay desegregation
for as long as possible. One of the last Symposium speakers indicated that
the board made a number of tactical decisions, strategic decisions, and subs-
tantive decisions, with respect to the early planning after Brown for dese-
gregation in the Little Rock School District. I would like to say that while
the board did that, the board did not do it on its own-the board acted very
clearly at the initiative of Virgil Blossom. Let there be no mistake that Mr.
Blossom was the architect and the mover and the effectuator of all of the
delay strategy. And his plan of course was to prolong desegregation for as
long as possible, to be spread out over as few pupils as possible and to allow
time for the schools in the district to re-segregate.
And the plan to begin with was not one for desegregation, or not one
for integration, but was one of limited desegregation. For those of you who
may be acquainted with Little Rock-and for those of you who do not know
Little Rock but who may become acquainted with Little Rock while you are
here-there are no people, hardly, in the Little Rock School District beyond
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the point then known as South Hayes Street. South Hayes Street is now
known as University Avenue, and it is in what is now the eastern part of the
central part of the city. And Mr. Blossom's plan necessarily required that
urban renewal and other city institutions along with the realty industry be
able to put in place new schools that would allow ultimate segregation and
perpetual segregation.
So schools were built where there were no people. Hall High School,
for instance, was built just west of the South Hayes Street, later renamed
University Avenue, and Forest Heights was built across the street from it a
few blocks just east of South Hayes Street. And the idea was that schools
would be fed from elementary schools looking into Pulaski Heights, Forest
Heights, and Hall High School-you would have a pure upper class, virtual-
ly all white school system. And then Central High School was supposed to
have been the school for the other people, meaning the poorer people white
and black, provided that the poorer white people would stay-and it was
anticipated that maybe the poorer white people would stay and maybe they
would not. And it has been pretty clear that the poorer people have not
stayed. The poor whites are not the ones who populate Central High School.
Now this is the context in which Wiley and the others had to operate.
In 1956 when they began the case, the idea was to pull the community to-
gether. Daisy Bates was not a well-liked person, and not very many people
in the black community wanted to have this action take place. So they had to
educate the community and try to mobilize support. Well, one thing that
helped, of course, in mobilizing the support was the opposition from Gover-
nor Faubus. And one thing that opposition does, especially such as the op-
position now to Katherine Mitchell and the present Little Rock School
Board, coming from powerful forces in the community, is that it causes coa-
lescence of the community. So black persons coalesced then and had to sup-
port the Little Rock Nine and Daisy Bates. And hopefully they are coalesc-
ing now to support this present black board. Now when I say black board, it
is a majority black board in Little Rock now-four out of seven-for the
first time in Little Rock's history.
One of the problems that Wiley and the others had was that there was
not a single person in the white community that they could rely upon for
anything. There was no board member; you had at-large elections. There
was no way that black people could have any kind of voice. They had to
take what was given, and the courts were hostile. So how do you litigate
within that context? It is very difficult, especially when you have a judge
from Fort Smith, Arkansas, who is saying we will give them due process but
deny them equal protection. But one of the things the Brown decision did
was it said that these decisions had to be dealt with on a individual, commu-
nity by community, school district by school district basis. And what that
said was that desegregation would not be immediate, nor would it be effec-
tive, because it took into account the fact that our resources were limited-
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and a lawyer's resources are limited-and that they could not be in many
places at the same time.
So what did they do? Well, Thurgood helped get the decision. Wiley
Branton argued the case in the Supreme Court in 1957 when it became
Cooper v. Aaron. But from that point on little was done until 1965 because
Wiley had to leave and did leave to head up the voter education project in
1963 in Atlanta, Georgia. Now what happened legally in 1957, you know
and that has been told many times, the United States Supreme Court indi-
cated that mob violence would not be a factor and could not be utilized to
delay implementation of core decisions and enjoyment of constitutional
rights. That was a pretty basic, fundamental principle. And as the previous
Symposium speakers pointed out, there was no support on a moral basis for
the Brown decision from the White House or in the highest levels of gov-
ernment.
But from 1957 until 2007, there has been a history of evasion in the
school district. Federal judges locally have not supported the concept and
we have had to rely upon the Supreme Court of the United States and the
intermediary courts to try to see to it that what was started in 1956 was in
some way or another implemented. We went to the Court of Appeals in the
intervening years. I began work on this case, I guess it is the longest running
case that I know of, but my involvement began with Wiley-he encouraged
me to do this-in 1965 when we reopened the case.
In the case called Clarg v. Board of Education, Judge Young-who
had very much difficulty in addressing the word, in using the term "ne-
gro"-wanted us to start a new case. And we did. So we ended Cooper v.
Aaron in 1965 and it then became Clarg v. Board of Education. And just as
an aside, to show you some of the problems you dealt with. Wiley was very
fair and had a good relationship with the judge at that time, who was also
from Pine Bluff, the late Judge Young. And Judge Young wanted to do the
right thing, follow the law and the like-he was the one who succeeded
Judge Miller, and ultimately Judge Davies. But the right thing was sort of
hard because he just felt that "the niggra people are just ready for integra-
tion. We have to find a way to see to it that the public schools are preserved
and also that these children get a good education. I know that these things
aren't right Wiley."
And I recalled one of my earlier visits with him and Wiley, and he and
Wiley had a good rapport. And he just kept referring to black people as nig-
gras, and Wiley said, "Look, I want you to do one thing for me, because
your judging has to depend on this and the public appearance of what you
say is important to helping people understand how implementation will be."
And he said, "you have to stop using the word niggra." And he said, "I don't
say niggra. I say negra." Wiley said to him, "Look, I want to you to change.
I want you to put your hand on your knee." And Judge Young said (touching
his knee) "I'll do it. That's my knee." And he said, "Just think about
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'grow'." And he said, "Grow?" And he says, "Judge just put it together:
'knee - grow."' And he said, "Niggra. Niggra ... ni ... niggra. Wiley, I just
can't say it."
Well, that was revealing because it revealed an attitude that was rooted
in the past, that made it very difficult for Judge Young and others who
wanted to do the right thing to make a break from their training and their
teaching and to comply with the Brown decision and then the Cooper v.
Aaron decision. That was part of the strategy: get them to change. And in
the years in between he did change somewhat. But over the years we have
had every evasionary technique put forth. And those practices continue.
The big thing that happened back then was that we had no voice. The
thing that we do have now is that we do have a voice. But that voice is being
repressed by the same forces that repressed black people in 1957. It is a
misnomer to say that all the people in 1957 who were opposing the decision
were poor and from out of the city and the like. They were from right here
and they were some of the people who are participating in this celebration
and who are being honored. It was they who drove those lower income
people. That was the way they projected their radical activity and actions.
But now they cannot hide anymore-they have to come on out front-and
you will see that as you observe this 50th Anniversary of the Central High
Crisis.

